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Packingham v. North Carolina (2017): Free Speech in the Age of Social Media

In Packingham v. North Carolina (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a 21st-century dilemma with profound implications for First Amendment rights: Can the government bar registered sex offenders from using social media?


In a unanimous decision (with a split on reasoning), the Court struck down a North Carolina law that made it a felony for registered sex offenders to access popular websites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. The ruling wasn’t just about the rights of one man—it was a sweeping affirmation that access to the digital public square is essential to modern free speech.



The Background: A Facebook Post and a Felony Charge


In 2002, Lester Gerard Packingham, then a 21-year-old college student, was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a minor and was required to register as a sex offender. Years later, in 2010, he was convicted again—not for any contact with a minor, but for something far more mundane: posting on Facebook.


Packingham had written a celebratory post thanking God after a traffic ticket was dismissed in court:

“Man God is Good! How about I got so much favor they dismissed the ticket before court even started? No fine, no court cost, no nothing spent… Praise be to GOD, WOW! Thanks JESUS!”

This post caught the attention of law enforcement officials, who identified Packingham as a registered sex offender and charged him with violating North Carolina General Statute § 14-202.5. The law made it illegal for registered sex offenders to access “commercial social networking websites” that permit children to become members. Packingham was convicted, but he appealed, arguing the law violated his First Amendment rights.



The Legal Question


The issue before the Supreme Court was deceptively simple: Can the government impose a blanket ban on an entire group of people—based on prior criminal status—accessing vast swaths of the internet where protected speech occurs?


North Carolina argued that the law served a vital interest in protecting children from potential online predation. They claimed it was a reasonable restriction on the internet use of registered sex offenders, similar to how such individuals might be barred from entering schools or playgrounds.


Packingham’s legal team countered that the law was overly broad and vague, barring access not only to places where minors congregate online but also to key spaces for political discourse, employment opportunities, religious expression, and social connection.



The Ruling: “The Most Important Place” for Speech


In an opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court struck down the law, holding that it violated the First Amendment. The decision was 8–0, with Justice Gorsuch not participating. Though all justices agreed with the outcome, they differed slightly in their legal reasoning.


Kennedy’s majority opinion emphasized the central role of the internet—particularly social media—in modern public life:

“While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’—in general, and social media in particular.”

Kennedy argued that North Carolina’s law was too sweeping. It failed to distinguish between websites designed for interpersonal contact with children and those that merely allowed children to use them. In doing so, it blocked access to vital platforms for speech on politics, religion, culture, and community engagement.


The ruling did not prohibit all internet-related restrictions for sex offenders. Still, it made clear that blanket bans on social media access—without narrow tailoring or compelling justification—would not survive constitutional scrutiny.



Concurring Opinions: Support with Caveats


Justices Alito, Roberts, and Thomas concurred in the judgment but expressed concern that Kennedy’s language about the internet being the “most important place for speech” might be too expansive.


Alito cautioned that the Court should avoid painting with too broad a brush when it comes to digital rights, particularly given the fast pace of technological change. Still, the concurring justices agreed that North Carolina’s law was overly broad and unconstitutional as written.



Broader Implications: The First Amendment and the Digital Public Square


Packingham v. North Carolina has far-reaching implications for how courts approach free speech in the digital age. The ruling recognized that platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn are no longer luxuries or trivial distractions—they are essential arenas for political dialogue, social mobilization, job seeking, and personal identity.


By comparing these platforms to traditional public forums, such as streets and parks, the Court signaled that access to the internet is now a prerequisite for meaningful participation in civic life.


Moreover, the decision reinforced a key principle: even when governments pursue noble goals, such as protecting children, they must do so in ways that respect constitutional boundaries. Overbroad laws that chill or eliminate entire categories of speech are still subject to the highest levels of judicial scrutiny.



Public Reaction and Legal Ramifications


Civil liberties organizations, digital rights groups, and First Amendment scholars lauded the decision. It affirmed that constitutional protections must evolve alongside technology, and that freedom of speech is not a privilege for some but a right for all, even those with deeply unpopular pasts.


On the flip side, some child advocacy groups expressed concern that the ruling could limit efforts to regulate the online activity of known offenders. However, the Court left the door open for narrowly tailored regulations that serve legitimate safety interests without shutting people out of essential channels of communication.



Packingham v. North Carolina stands as a defining case for free speech in the 21st century. It reminds us that the internet is not a separate world from public life—it is, in fact, public life. To ban access to its platforms is, in effect, to prohibit a person from engaging in the political, cultural, and social conversations that shape modern society.


As Justice Kennedy wrote:

“Even convicted criminals—and in some instances especially convicted criminals—might receive legitimate benefits from these means for access to the world of ideas.”

In upholding the First Amendment in the digital age, the Court once again affirmed that liberty does not bend to fear, and that constitutional rights persist, even in the face of the internet’s most complex and controversial challenges.

Disclaimer: The articles in this series are intended for educational and informational purposes only. They are designed to provide general insight into landmark legal cases and their impact on free speech, civil rights, and public discourse. Nothing in these articles should be construed as legal advice. Additionally, the views and interpretations presented do not necessarily reflect the personal opinions or positions of For The Writers or its affiliated entities.

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