The Strike That Changed Everything: Operation Midnight Hammer and the Collapse of Nuclear Oversight
- Jul 12
- 9 min read
Updated: 2 days ago
Operation Midnight Hammer was intended as a show of strength, but it became a turning point in the debate over nuclear security. The strike revealed deep fractures within the oversight system, where regulators, military officials, and civilian agencies failed to coordinate or establish clear lines of accountability. In its aftermath, watchdog groups and lawmakers began questioning how such a massive lapse could occur undetected, and whether the safeguards meant to prevent catastrophe were ever reliable. The fallout continues to reshape security policy, forcing a reckoning over secrecy, transparency, and the limits of government responsibility in the nuclear era.
Operation Midnight Hammer and Nuclear Oversight Failures
On June 21, 2025, the United States launched an unannounced and unauthorized military strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. No congressional approval was sought or obtained. The operation, coordinated with Israel and later confirmed by U.S. officials, targeted three facilities—Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—using a fleet of B‑2 bombers equipped with GBU‑57 bunker-buster bombs and submarine-fired Tomahawks.
The strike directly targeted Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities. The goal, as later admitted by White House officials, was to “inflict long-term functional damage” on Iran’s nuclear program without triggering a declared war.
Within hours, Iran’s nuclear oversight collapsed. The International Atomic Energy Agency was denied access to all three sites. Inspectors were evacuated. By July, the IAEA had no physical presence in Iran for the first time in over two decades. Global nuclear monitoring, once flawed but functioning, now exists only through limited remote surveillance—and only where Iran allows it.
Contrary to initial U.S. claims, intelligence now confirms that quantities of 60% enriched uranium were not destroyed but remain buried and intact. The estimated disruption to Iran’s program is temporary, projected at one to two years. Meanwhile, Iran retains its scientific capacity, its remaining facilities, and its political leverage.
Diplomatic groundwork, allied consensus, and legislative review were conducted.
Precision Bombing Meets Political Fallout
Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, three core sites in Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, were directly hit during the June 21, 2025, U.S. strike. Fordow’s underground enrichment halls suffered a severe structural collapse. Natanz, home to Iran’s advanced centrifuge production, was partially disabled. Isfahan, a key conversion facility, was also damaged. U.S. officials described the operation as highly successful in degrading Iran’s capabilities.
Iran responded immediately with a statement asserting that high-value nuclear materials had already been relocated in anticipation of possible strikes. They also claimed no measurable radiation release, and no civilian casualties were reported. The International Atomic Energy Agency was not granted access to independently verify either claim.
Commercial and military satellite imagery showed widespread surface-level destruction, collapsed roofs, and disrupted infrastructure across all three sites. However, there is still no verified data on the quantity, condition, or location of the enriched uranium that was stored underground. Intelligence estimates remain inconclusive.
On June 24, Iran launched ballistic missiles at a U.S. base in Qatar, marking the first direct military response. The base sustained damage, and multiple U.S. personnel were injured, despite little news coverage on this matter. This marked a shift from covert proxy tensions to direct state-to-state engagement.
Iran’s Answer: A Strike, a Threat, and Silence
On June 24, 2025, at approximately 02:30 local time, Iran launched a missile strike on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which houses U.S. and coalition forces. According to a Pentagon briefing later that day, 13 American service members were injured, two of them seriously, and infrastructure damage included a hangar, radar equipment, and portions of the tarmac. This was Iran’s first direct military action against the United States in response to the June 21 U.S.-led strike on its nuclear facilities.
In the hours that followed, the U.S. Central Command elevated its threat posture across Gulf installations, and U.S. Navy forces were repositioned in the Persian Gulf to monitor additional missile activity. No further attacks were reported in the immediate 48-hour window that followed.
On June 26, 2025, Iran’s parliament passed a resolution titled the National Security Inspection Oversight Act, which revoked the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) automatic access to all nuclear sites. Under this law, any future inspections would require pre-approval by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, effectively pausing all verification activities.
On July 2, 2025, the IAEA publicly confirmed the withdrawal of all inspectors from Iranian territory. The agency cited safety concerns, including the presence of unexploded ordnance at Fordow and Natanz, and the lack of guaranteed security provisions from Iranian authorities. The withdrawal included all on-site staff, halting physical verification of enrichment levels, centrifuge activity, and material inventory.
This marks the first complete cessation of IAEA presence inside Iran since 2003, when inspections were suspended amid earlier nuclear tensions. While Iran continues to claim cooperation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the absence of physical inspectors makes independent verification of that claim impossible as of July 12, 2025.
The Strait of Hormuz and the Knife’s Edge of Oil
On June 25, 2025, Iran’s Foreign Ministry issued a formal statement warning that continued U.S. military action could result in the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway through which approximately 30% of the world’s seaborne oil passes. This warning came four days after the U.S. and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.
In the 48 hours that followed, U.S. intelligence agencies, including the Office of Naval Intelligence and Central Command, reported that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Navy had begun laying preparations for naval mine deployment in the Persian Gulf. No mines were confirmed to have entered the water, but surveillance imagery captured activity consistent with pre-staging anti-ship ordnance near the Strait.
On June 26, 2025, oil markets reacted sharply. Brent crude futures rose 9.2% in a single trading session, closing above $101 per barrel for the first time since early 2023. Maritime insurers raised risk premiums for tankers transiting the Strait, and several major shipping carriers rerouted vessels through the Red Sea or paused operations entirely.
In response, the U.S. Navy deployed two additional guided missile destroyers from the Fifth Fleet to reinforce presence in the Strait, bringing the total number of U.S. naval vessels in the region to eight as of June 28. Naval exercises were intensified, and drone surveillance was expanded across the Strait of Hormuz and its surrounding shipping lanes.
By the end of the first week following the strike, global markets were on edge, not only due to the potential military escalation but also because of the clear vulnerability of a critical artery in the world's energy supply chain. As of July 12, 2025, the Strait remains open; however, the risk of closure remains an explicit part of Iran’s retaliatory posture, which is monitored daily by allied naval and intelligence forces.
Damage Control and the Limits of Power
On July 5, 2025, U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials confirmed that despite extensive physical damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz, stocks of enriched uranium—measured at up to 60% purity—had not been destroyed. Classified assessments shared with select members of NATO indicated that portions of Iran’s uranium inventory remained buried beneath collapsed structures, particularly in Fordow’s subterranean enrichment halls. Attempts to extract this material, officials warned, would pose both radiological and strategic risks, including the possibility of further airstrikes if recovery efforts resumed.
Western intelligence agencies jointly estimated that the strike had delayed Iran’s nuclear program by approximately 12 to 24 months, depending on Iran’s ability to rebuild centrifuge capacity and reestablish infrastructure. This marked a significant shift from earlier White House claims that the program had been “crippled.”
Meanwhile, diplomatic fallout intensified.
On July 10, 2025, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi delivered a televised national address in which he accused the U.S., United Kingdom, and France of orchestrating what he called “nuclear colonialism”—a term he used to describe the unequal treatment of non-Western nations under the global nonproliferation regime. He announced that Iran would no longer recognize the legitimacy of Western-led diplomatic frameworks unless they were restructured to include regional powers on equal footing.
The following day, July 11, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi told reporters in Tehran that Iran would consider resuming cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—but only under new terms. These would include case-by-case approvals for inspections, heightened security protocols for inspectors, and preconditions that no information gathered by the IAEA could be shared with Western intelligence agencies.
As of July 12, 2025, the IAEA has no inspectors on the ground in Iran, no formal inspection schedule, and no operational oversight of Iran’s declared or undeclared nuclear activity. The only available monitoring is remote and partial, based on satellite imaging and public statements from Iranian officials. There is currently no agreement in place to restore full access.
Unanswered Questions at Home
On June 22, 2025, within 24 hours of the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, multiple members of Congress issued public statements condemning the operation as unauthorized and potentially unconstitutional. Senator Bernie Sanders, along with Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ro Khanna, and Thomas Massie, called for a formal congressional investigation into whether President Trump violated the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which requires either a declaration of war or specific legislative authorization for sustained military engagement.
In a letter sent to House leadership on June 24, a bipartisan group of lawmakers demanded hearings to examine the legal basis of Operation Midnight Hammer and to determine whether the administration had withheld intelligence or bypassed required notifications under the National Security Act.
By June 30, 2025, over 60 constitutional law scholars from institutions including Yale, Stanford, and Georgetown had signed a joint statement asserting that the strike lacked both constitutional and international legal justification, given that no active armed conflict existed between the United States and Iran at the time of the operation.
Despite growing calls for oversight, the administration has not released the legal memo or intelligence findings used to justify the strike. The Pentagon confirmed that no consultation with congressional leadership took place before the operation.
As of July 12, 2025, no formal investigation has begun. No classified briefing on the strike’s legal rationale has been made available to the full House or Senate. The executive branch has continued to assert that the strike was a “preemptive defensive action,” though it has provided no documentation to support that claim under existing U.S. or international law.
One undisputed fact remains: the President of the United States authorized a large-scale offensive military operation during peacetime, without informing Congress, without debate, and without oversight. The constitutional implications remain unresolved, while the geopolitical consequences continue to unfold.
A New Precedent and a New Precipice
What began on June 21, 2025, as a targeted military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities has resulted in the most significant collapse of nuclear oversight between Iran and the international community since inspections began in the early 2000s.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which maintained physical access to Iran’s nuclear program for over two decades, has now fully withdrawn from the country as of July 2, 2025. There are no inspectors on the ground, no active inspections scheduled, and no binding agreement in place to resume site access. All monitoring is now dependent on satellite surveillance and voluntary disclosures by Iran, neither of which can independently verify uranium enrichment levels or centrifuge activity.
Iran’s nuclear development continues without third-party verification. Its government has publicly stated it will allow limited, conditional cooperation moving forward, but no terms have been formalized. The IAEA has acknowledged that it no longer has operational oversight of Iran’s nuclear program.
Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz remains a declared pressure point. Iran has not followed through on its threat to close the waterway, but U.S. intelligence reports confirm that mining preparations remain active as of July 8, 2025. The global oil market remains unstable, with prices fluctuating and regional shipping risk premiums increasing.
No formal diplomatic framework has emerged to replace the defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and no multilateral talks have been scheduled to address the post-strike crisis. The United Nations Security Council remains divided, and neither Russia nor China has agreed to new negotiation terms with the U.S.
This is not an officially declared war, but it represents a rupture with the diplomatic and legal structures that once governed the prevention of nuclear conflict. The operation was conducted without congressional authorization and international consensus. As of July 12, 2025, there is no documented strategy from the U.S. administration outlining next steps.
What exists now is a power struggle that has evolved into a diplomatic, procedural, and informational nature. It is not the beginning of a new war, but rather the start of an unregulated phase in U.S.–Iran relations, characterized by a lack of established oversight, trusted communication channels, and a lack of a plan in place.
For The Writers is committed to documenting history as it unfolds. Our responsibility is to the American people, not to a party or platform. While we report on political decisions and global events with depth and urgency, our coverage is grounded in verified facts, not political affiliation or preference.
References
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